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Abstract.  We propose  an  optical  security technique  for  image  encryption using triple  random phase  encoding
(TRPE). In the encryption process, the original image is first double random phase encrypted. The obtained function
is then multiplied by a third random phase key in the output plane, to enhance the security level of the encryption
process.  This method reduces the vulnerability to certain attacks observed when using the conventional double
random phase encoding (DRPE). To provide the security enhancement of the proposed TRPE method, three attack
cases are discussed: Chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), Known-plaintext attacks (KPA) and chosen-ciphertext attacks
(CCA).  Numerical  results  are  presented  to  demonstrate  feasibility  and  effectiveness  of  the  proposed  method.
Compared with conventional DRPE, the proposed encryption method can provide an effective alternative and has
enhanced security features against the above-mentioned attacks.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, research on optical techniques for image encryption has gained a great potential
owing to  their  high parallel  processing  speed and large  storage memories  [1–10].  The main
motivation for  using optics for information security is  that  optical  waveforms possess many
complex degrees of freedom such as amplitude, phase, polarization, large bandwidth, nonlinear
transformations, quantum properties of photons, and multiplexing that can be combined in many
ways to make information encryption more secure and more difficult to attack. Several methods
for  optical  image encryption have been proposed such as those based on digital  holography
[11,12],  virtual  optics  [13],  diffractive imaging [14],  ghost imaging [15],  ptychography [16],
interferometry [17],  polarization  [18,19],  photon-counting  [20],  etc.   In  1995,  Refrégier  and
Javidi [21], proposed the ‘double random phase encoding’ (DRPE) scheme. The DRPE method
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has  awakened  the  interest  of  many authors  and  it  has  been  extended  to  different  canonical
transforms which have been protected by several patents. Its principle consists in encrypting the
input image into stationary white noise by using two random phase masks under a 4f optical
processor.  Recently,  some experimental  realization  of  the  optical  encryption-decryption  have
been achieved by researchers [22-25].
The strength of  any good encryption  scheme resides  in  its  behavior  against  unauthorized
resources that wants to reveal some encrypted information. The security of DRPE method has
been thoroughly analyzed [24-41], showing that such scheme is robust against the brute force
attack, and vulnerable to known-plaintext attack (KPA) [28-31], chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
[32-35], chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) [36], and ciphertext-only attack [37,38,24,25]. In order
to  enhance  security  level  of  DRPE,  multiple  works  have  been proposed by several  authors.
Among them, Hennely and Sheridan [42] proposed an encryption scheme based on an image
scrambling  technique  that  uses  the  Jigsaw  Transform.  The  image  security  of  scrambling
techniques was studied in Ref. [43]. In particular, efficient hierarchical chaotic image encryption
(HCIE)  algorithm was  analyzed in  detail  and they concluded that  the  security of  the  HCIE
against ciphertext-only attack was overestimated. Cheng et al. [44] proposed a security enhanced
double  random  phase-amplitude  encryption  (DRPAE)  by  adding  an  undercover  amplitude-
modulating operation in the Fourier domain. They also demonstrated that the DRPAE can resist
the  traditional  (KPA).  However,  Kumar  et  al.  [34]  have  demonstrated  the  vulnerability  of
(DRPAE) scheme in front of a point spread function attack and He et al. [33] have proved that
DRPAE is also vulnerable to a Hybrid two-step attack, which utilizes a chosen-plaintext attack
followed by a known-plaintext attack. Recently, Elshamy et al. [45] proposed an optical image
encryption method based on chaotic Baker map and DRPE, which consists of two layers. The
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first layer is a preprocessing chaotic baker map which performs the randomization of the image
pixels  and  the  second  layer  is  the  conventional  DRPE.  However,  Zhang  et  al.  [35]  have
demonstrated the vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) of the encryption model using
scrambling preprocessing before DRPE. Recently,  there are several attack methods that were
proposed based on correlated imaging [39], ptychographical imaging [40] and wavefront shaping
technique [41].
In this paper, we propose a triple random phase encryption (TRPE) scheme. In particular, the
proposed encryption system has a major purpose, which is to improve the security of optical
encryption based on double-random phase encryption (DRPE) in a 4f system against different
type of attacks. This means that the TRPE method here proposed shows appropriate security
levels in front of different particular attacks where the DRPE method fails. Note that the DRPE
vulnerability in front of such specific attacks has been extensively proved by different authors in
the literature.  
Therefore, we want to emphasize that the extension of the DRPE by including a third random
phase (TRPE method) is not only increasing the complexity of the system, in terms of more keys
required to descript the system, but we want to show how specific attacks that already proved the
DRPE vulnerability, are not effective when attacking a system encrypted with the TRPE method.
Thus, the applicability and the security levels of the method are improved when compared with
the DRPE approach.
In addition, we want to note that the number of the phase random keys used in the encryption
process (TRPE case) to increase the security levels, does not correspond to a random guess, but it
is the optimal key number in terms of applicability. This means that we have to look for the
minimum number of keys providing enough security levels in front of the above-stated attacks,
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but leading to an optical scheme that can be experimentally implemented. As logical, a large
number of random keys will lead to a bulky set-up of large complexity,  which could not be
practical for experimental proposes. However, in this paper we provide how by including just a
third key, the resulting optical scheme can be still considered for an experimental implementation
and the security levels are significantly improved.    
The above-stated security novelty with a faceable optical scheme is provided thorough the
paper by discussing three different attacks where the DRPE proves to be vulnerable: chosen-
plaintext attacks (CPA), known-plaintext attacks (KPA) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). In
all the analyzed cases, the security levels of the TRPE method are robust where the DRPE fails.
Accordingly, this paper is arranged as follows: in section 2, the theoretical method to design
the proposed TRPE scheme is  first  described.  In  section 3,  we present  simulation results  to
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method by working out an example of a grayscale
image and binary image of size (256×256 pixels). We further test the strength of this encryption
process against CPA, KPA, and CCA. Finally, the main conclusions of the work are given in
section 4.
2 TRPE basic concepts
Let us briefly describe the concept of optical encryption system based on a DRPE scheme.  Let
f (x , y )  be  the  input  image  to  be  encrypted,  e (x , y )  the  encrypted  image,  and
ϕk1(x , y )  and ϕk2(u , v )  two random noises that are uniformly distributed over the interval
[0,  1],  where  ( x , y )  and  (u , v )  denote  the  spatial  and  frequency  domain  coordinates,
respectively.  First,  the  input  image  f (x , y )  is  multiplied  by  a  phase-only  mask
k1 ( x , y )=exp [i 2π ϕk1 (x , y ) ] .  Then,  the  image  resulting  from  this  product  is  Fourier
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transformed to the spatial frequency domain, where it is multiplied by a second random phase
mask  k2 (u , v )=exp [i 2πϕk2 (u , v ) ] .  Finally,  another Fourier transformation is applied to the
obtained  image,  this  leading  to  the  final  encrypted  image.  This  process  is  mathematically
described by:
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where  × denotes the dot product ,  ⊗ denotes convolution and  h ( x , y )  is a mask whose
inverse  Fourier  transform  (FT)  is  equal  to  the  k2 (u , v )  mask,  i.e.
h ( x , y )=FT {k2 (u , v ) }=FT {exp [i2π ϕk2 (u , v ) ]} . 
We propose to add a third phase-only mask to the standard DRPE encryption scheme. Let us
call this new encryption scheme as Triple Random Phase Encryption (TRPE). In particular, we
suggest multiplying the  eDRPE ( x , y )  image in Eq. (1) by the  k3 ( x , y )=exp [ i2π ϕk3 ( x , y ) ]
phase-only mask, where  ϕk3 (x , y )  is a random noise image limited within the range [0,1].
Under this scenario, the encrypted image for the proposed TRPE scheme is expressed as:
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Due to symmetry considerations, the decryption process for the TRPE scheme is the reverse
of  the  above-explained  encryption  process.  First,  the  encrypted  image  eTRPE (x , y )  is
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multiplied by the complex conjugate of the k3 ( x , y )  phase mask, i.e. by k3
¿ ( x , y )  (where
the  symbol  * denotes  complex conjugate).  Then,  the  inverse  Fourier  transform (IFT) of  the
product is taken. The result is then multiplied by the complex conjugate of the second phase-only
mask   k2
¿ (u , v ) .  Finally,  the  IFT  is  taken  once  again  on  the  resulting  image,  this
transformation leading to the product of the input image f ( x , y )  with the first mask used in
the encryption process, k1 ( x , y ) . Therefore, this product is multiplied by k1
¿ ( x , y )  and the
decrypted image f ' ( x , y )  is obtained. The decryption process is mathematically written as,
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For the sake of clarity, the flowchart of the encryption and decryption processes is shown in
Figs. 1(a) and 1(b), respectively.
Fig. 1 The block diagrams for the TRPE scheme: (a) Encryption process; (b) Decryption process.
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Afterwards,  we also provide an example of a possible optical setup useful to implement the
encryption process of the TRPE scheme (Fig. 2). The optical scheme is based on the well-known
4f optical processor (see Fig. 1(a)). Note that the function e ( x , y )  in Fig. 1(a) is a complex
valued  function.  Therefore,  the  4f processor  has  to  be  experimentally  implemented  on  an
interferometric based set-up, this allowing us to both obtain the amplitude and the phase of the
encrypted  image.  To this  aim,  we propose  an  optical  scheme inspired  on the  phase-shifting
interferometric  correlation  set-up  implemented  in  Ref.  [46],  which  was  based  on  a  March-
Zehnder  interferometer.  In  particular,  a  coherent  monochromatic  light  source  illuminates  the
optical system. The input beam is split in two light beams by means of a non-polarizing Beam-
Splitter (BS1). The reflected beam, let us call it Reference Beam (RB), is filtered and collimated
by using a spatial filter (PH1) properly combined with a convergent lens (L). Then, the RB is
steered to the CCD, placed at the coordinate plane (X4,Y4), by using the Mirror 3 and a second
Beam-Splitter (BS2). By contrast, the light transmitted on the BS1, let us call it as Transmitted
Beam (TB), is filtered and collimated thanks to the combined action of the spatial filter (PH2)
and the convergent lens (L1). Afterwards, the 4f optical processor is assembled by using the
convergent lenses L2 and L3. The desired input object f ( x , y )  is multiplied by the phase-only
mask  k1 ( x , y )  at  the  (X1,Y1)  plane.  The  phase  function  corresponding  to  the  first  key
k1 ( x , y )  can  be  physically  implemented  by  addressing  the  function  to  a  Spatial  Light
Modulator (SLM1) placed at  the  ( X 1 ,Y 1 ) plane.  Next, the Fourier Transform (FT) of the
phase function addressed to the SLM1 ( f ( x , y )k 1 ( x , y ) ) is obtained at convergent lens L2 focal
lane, i.e. at the (X2,Y2) plane. At this plane, the SLM2 is placed, being responsible of generating
the  second  phase  mask, k2 (u , v ) .  Afterwards,  the  third  phase-only  mask,  k3 ( x , y ) is
generated at the (X3,Y3) plane thanks to the use of the SLM3. Note that the FT of the phase
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distribution at the (X2,Y2) plane is obtained at the (X3,Y3) plane because of the lens L3. Finally,
a convergent lens L4 images the (X3,Y3) plane on the CCD camera. This beam interferes with
the reference beam, and the corresponding interference pattern is registered at the CCD camera.
Note that this final intensity distribution can be subsequently used for the decryption process.
Fig. 2 Optical setup for the implementation of the encryption procedure of the TRPE scheme.
3 Numerical simulations and analysis
Numerical simulations were carried out to analyze the performance of the proposed encryption
scheme.  As illustrated  in  Fig.  3,  the  original  images  used  for  encryption  in  our  case  are:  a
multiple gray levels based image (Lena image, Fig. 3(a)) and a two-gray level based image (text
“OPTICS”, Fig. 3(e)). All the images used in this work present a size of 256×256 pixels. First, in
Section 3.1., we test the suitability of the TRPE method for image encryption, as well as for
retrieving  original  images  after  decryption.  In  addition,  the  robustness  of  the  method under
attacks using slightly modified keys for the decryption process is also analyzed. Afterwards, in
Section 3.2, we prove the superior performance of the TRPE method under several attacks, when
compared with the classical DRPE scheme.
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3.1 TRPE encryption-decryption testing
Original images in Fig. 3 were encrypted by using the TRPE method, and the corresponding
results are shown in Figs.  3(b) and 3(f), for the Lena image (Fig. 3(a)) and the binary text image
(Fig. 3(e)) respectively.  Afterwards, the decryption process explained in Section 2 (Eq.(3)) is
applied on the encrypted images. To test the influence of the security keys on the decrypted
images, the corresponding decrypted images are calculated under two different scenarios: (case
A) on the basis of the exact masks k1, k2 and k3, so the correct keys are used; and (case B) by
using incorrect keys, i.e. keys resulting from applying some modification on the original keys. 
In particular, we generated tree random masks k1, k2 and k3 (see Figs. 4(a)-(c)) which were used
for  the  encryption  process.  When using  these  exact  three  masks for  decryption,  we use the
correct keys (case A). Then, we generated a fourth random mask, k4 (Fig. 4(d)). To perform the
incorrect keys case (case B), we use the k4 phase mask instead of the k3 mask. Thus, the incorrect
key case is performed by using the k1, k2 and k4 phase-masks for the decryption process.
The decrypted images obtained by using the incorrect keys (case B) are shown in Figs. 3(c)
and 3(g),  for  the  Lena image and for  the  binary image respectively.  By contrast,  decrypted
images obtained by using the correct keys (case A) are shown in Figs. 3(d) and 3(h) respectively.
To evaluate the quality of the decrypted images, we use the mean-square error (MSE) and the
peak-signal-to noise (PSNR) metrics, which are calculated as,
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Where  f ( x , y )  and  f ' ( x , y )  denote  the  original  image  and  the  decrypted  image,
respectively. 
By using the decrypted images obtained from the correct keys (case A), the calculated MSE and
PSNR values between the original Lena image (Fig. 3(a)) and the decrypted image (Fig. 3(d)) are
of 1.28×10-31 and 357.05 respectively. For the binary image case (images in Figs. 3(e) and 3(h)),
the MSE and PSNR obtained values are 3.52×10-32 and 362.65, respectively. The obtained values
state for the similarity between the original and the decrypted images. In addition, obtained MSE
and PSNR results are in the order of those obtained by using the standard DRPE, this providing
the equivalence of the two methods when using correct keys.
Fig. 3 (a) Lena image; (b) Lena encrypted image; (c) Lena decrypted image by using incorrect keys; (d) Lena
decrypted image by using correct keys; (e) Binary text (BT) image; (f) encrypted BT image; (g) BT decrypted image
by using incorrect keys; (h) BT decrypted image by using correct keys.
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Fig. 4 Generated phase masks for the encryption-decryption steps.
3.2 TRPE cryptanalysis
To highlight the interest of using the TRPE method over the classical DRPE scheme, we tested
the resistance of the proposed TRPE scheme against three different types of attacks: chosen-
plaintext  attack  (CPA),  known-plaintext  attacks  (KPA),  and  chosen-ciphertext  attack  (CCA).
Those mentioned attacks have already been used to break the DRPE encryption system in the
Fourier domain. A comparison of the security results obtained under the above-stated attacks for
the two considered schemes (DRPE and the proposed TRPE) is also presented.
3.2.1 TRPE method resistance to chosen-plaintext attacks
In CPA, the attackers have the capability to choose arbitrary designed input plaintext in order to
determine the secret keys. To perform the above-stated comparison between methods, we assume
that the attackers choose a Dirac delta function δ ( x , y )  as a plaintext to be encrypted, as this
approach  has  already proved the  vulnerability  of  the  DRPE scheme in  Fourier  and  Fresnel
domains [26,27,32,33].
The Dirac delta function can be written as,
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Thus, the Dirac delta function is displayed as an image with only one nonzero value located at
the center and all the other values being equal to 0. For a resolution of 256x256 pixels, this
function is depicted in Fig. 5(a). For the sake of clarity, a 3D representation of the Dirac delta
function is also provided at the bottom of Fig. 5(a).
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Let us start the security analysis by analyzing the DRPE scheme. When the input image of
the classical DRPE scheme is replaced with the Dirac delta function (i.e. ( f ( x , y )=δ ( x , y ) ) ),
Eq. (1) becomes,
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and  thus,  the  obtained  encrypted  image  eDRPE ( x , y )|CPA  is  equivalent  to  the  h ( x , y )
function, from which the phase mask  k2 (u , v ) could be retrieved by applying the IFT of the
h ( x , y )  function.  Note  that  if  the  object  function  f ( x , y ) is  a  real  function,  it  is  not
necessary to know the phase mask k1 for the decryption process. Consequently, the attackers can
retrieve the secret keys, and then reveal the input image. 
The above-stated situation was analyzed in more detail for the Lena image case. To this aim,
we used the DRPE method and the particular k1 and k2 keys stated in Section 3.1 (see Figs. 4 (a)
and (b)). The following procedure was followed. First, by using  f ( x , y )=δ ( x , y ) in Eq. (1),
the encrypted image in Fig. 5(b) was obtained. Second, we applied the FT on Eq. (1), this leading
to,
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By replacing (7) into (8) and rearranging, we obtain,
12
                               
        1
,
, exp 2 , ,
,
DRPE
k
DRPE CPA
FT e x y
f x y i x y IFT
FT e x y

� �� �� � �� � � �
99\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Afterwards, we used the encrypted Lena image  eDRPE ( x , y )  (calculated by applying the
DRPE method) in the numerator of Eq. (9) and the encrypted image eDRPE ( x , y )|CPA  (obtained
by using the Dirac delta function as an input function with the DRPE scheme; see image in Fig.
5(b)) in the denominator of Eq. (9). By doing this, and by applying the modulus of the obtained
result, we finally recovered the information of the input image, as shown in Fig. 5(c). Therefore,
by  using  the  Dirac  delta  function  as  a  chosen-plaintext  image  in  the  DRPE  method,  any
encrypted input image can be retrieved.
For comparison, we repeated the same study but now for the proposed TRPE scheme. Note
that when the input image is replaced by the Dirac delta function in Eq. (2) (TRPE case), this
formula is rewritten as,
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Note that according to the Eq. (10) we will be unable to directly retrieve any information of
the used keys, as in the DRPE case given by Eq. (7). Thus, the relevant key information is still
encrypted and an external chosen-plaintext attack based on the Dirac delta function does not
retrieve the keys distributions.
We analyzed this statement by using again the Lena image as a particular case. To this aim,
we used the exact phase masks k2 and k3 provided in Section 3.1 (see Figs. 4(b) and (c)) into the
TRPE encryption process given in Eq. (10). By doing this, the Dirac delta function encrypted
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image eTRPE ( x , y )|CPA  was obtained for the TRPE case, which is pictured in figure 5(d). Next,
this  calculated  eTRPE ( x , y )|CPA  image  was  introduced  to  the  denominator  of  Eq.  (9).  By
contrast,  for  the  numerator  we  used  the  encrypted  Lena  image  eTRPE (x , y ) ,  which  was
calculated by applying the TRPE method according to Eq. (2) (see Fig. 3(b)). Finally, we applied
the modulus of the resulting image, this leading to the final decrypted image, which is pictured in
Fig. 5(e). We see how the decrypted image presents a noisy appearance when dealing with the
TRPE scheme. Therefore, unlike the traditional DRPE method, the TRPE scheme does not allow
retrieving any information about the generated security keys by using the Dirac delta function as
CPA. Consequently, the actual object image cannot be revealed. 
The  results  provided  in  this  sub-section  invalidate  the  DRPE method  to  be  used  when
chosen-plaintext attacks are conducted, in particular, when the Dirac delta function is used as
CPA. Unlike this, the interest of using the TRPE method was highlighted because we proved its
reliability and security under the same attack,  showing that no input  object information was
retrieved.
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Fig. 5 (a) chosen plaintext (Dirac delta function), (b) encrypted image of DRPE with CPA, (c) decrypted image of
DRPE with the CPA algorithm, (d) encrypted image of TRPE with CPA algorithm, (e) decrypted image of TRPE
with CPA algorithm.
3.2.2 TRPE method resistance to known-plaintext attacks
In this section, we analyze the strength of TRPE encryption method against known-plaintext
attack (KPA). In KPA the attackers have a priori knowledge of the encryption method as well as
a  pair  of  the  plaintext  and  corresponding  ciphertext.  Gopinathan  et  al.  proposed  a  known-
plaintext attack scheme where the key is obtained through a simulated annealing process [28].
Afterward, Peng et al. demonstrated an approach to known-plaintext attack on DRPE system by
using phase  retrieval  algorithm [29].  In  our  analysis  we perform the  KPA with  an  iterative
process that is based on the Gerchberg-Saxton (GS) algorithm [47] in order to have the access to
the phase key k1 ( x , y )  in the input plane. Then, we deduce the second key k2 (u , v ) of the
frequency plane from the retrieved k1 ( x , y ) .
In the case of the DRPE encryption scheme, the second key k2 (u , v ) can be retrieved using
the following expression,
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Figure 6 reveals the simulation results with the use of known-plaintext attack applied to DRPE
encryption system. Figure 6(a) and 6(b) illustrate the input images used on the simulation. The
corresponding  encrypted  images  in  the  case  of  DRPE are  presented  in  Figs.  6(c)  and  6(e),
respectively.  The  decrypted  images  obtained  after  going  through  the  KPA  algorithm  are
displayed in Figs. 6(d) and 6(f), respectively. As it shown, the decrypted images provide enough
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information to recognize the input images,  proving the vulnerability of the DRPE scheme to
known-plaintext attacks.
By contrast, if we try to explore the resistance of the proposed TRPE to KPA using the same
above-described algorithm (Eq. 11), and after going through the retrieved random phase key k2,
we obtain,
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We see from Eq. (12) that we are not able to retrieve the key  k2 (u , v )  because the key
k3 ( x , y )  is still unknown. Figure 6 presents the conducted simulation results with the use of
KPA algorithm to the proposed TRPE scheme. Figure 6(g) and 6(i) present the encrypted images
corresponding to input images 6(a) and 6(b) respectively, in the case of the TRPE scheme. Figure
6(h)  and 6(j)  show the  corresponding decrypted  images  when using  the  KPA algorithm.  As
shown in Figs. 6(h) and 6(j), the decrypted images are very noisy and the attack does not provide
any information of the original input images. From these results we conclude that the TRPE
scheme improves the vulnerability of DRPE against KPA.
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Fig. 6 (a) Lena input image; (b) binary text input image; (c) and (e) DRPE encrypted images of Lena and binary
text, respectively; (d) and (f) DRPE decrypted images of Lena and binary text with KPA algorithm; (g) and (i) TRPE
encrypted images of Lena and binary text, respectively; (h) and (j) TRPE decrypted images of Lena and binary text
with KPA algorithm.
3.2.3 TRPE method resistance to chosen-ciphertext attacks
The chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the cryptanalyst
can collect information by obtaining the decryptions of chosen ciphertexts. From these pieces of
information the attacker can attempt to recover the hidden secret keys used for decryption. To
accomplish this  attack, the attacker must be able to enter a one-to-many ciphertexts into the
decryption system and then obtain the resulting plaintext. From this information, the secret keys
can be recovered for use in the decryption process. We perform the CCA reported by Carnicer et
al [34], where the attacker uses the ciphertext signal defined by the following expression,
                         
         1 1 2 21, exp 2 exp 2 exp 2 exp 2 ,2b x y x ye x y i f x i f y i f x i f y   � �� �
1313\* MERGEFORMAT ()
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The Fourier  transform of  eb ( x , y )  consists  of  two Dirac  delta  centered at  frequencies
( f x1 , f y1 )  and ( f x2 , f y2 )  respectively, and it is given by,
                         
      1 1 2 21, , , ,2b x y x yFT e u v u f v f u f v f � �     � �
1414\* MERGEFORMAT ()
In the optical decryption system, the captured intensity would have a cosine-type distribution,
such as the following one [4],
                              
 
   
   
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 1 1
2'
2 21 1, cos ,
2 2 , ,
x x y y
b
k x y k x y
f f x f f y
f x y
f f f f
 
 
� �  � �  � � � �
1515\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Where  ϕk2  represents  the  phase  distribution  of  the  key  used  in  Fourier  plane  (
k2 (u , v )=exp [i 2πϕk2 (u , v ) ] ).
The value of the phase difference ϕk2 ( f x2, f y2)−ϕk2 ( f x1 , f y1 )  can be computed with respect
to a reference, and then the decryption key can be completely recovered. In the case of DRPE the
light distribution at the output is given by:
                                        
     ' *2, , , ,b DRPE bf x y FT e u v k u v� � � �
1616\* MERGEFORMAT ()
If we apply the same algorithm described above on the TRPE, the light distribution at the
output will be,
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        ' * *3 2, , , , ,b TRPE bf x y FT FT e x y k x y k u v� � �� �
1717\* MERGEFORMAT ()
According to Eq. (17), the designed ciphertext eb ( x , y )  is distorted by the random phase
mask k3
¿ ( x , y )  and becomes an optical random function. Thus, the attacker cannot collect any
useful information by obtaining the decryptions of chosen ciphertexts.  As reported by Carnicer
et al [36], ciphertext attack is only efficient for real input signal. Hence, TRPE anticipates any
kind of ciphertext attack due to the complex nature of the random phase mask.
4 Conclusion
Summarizing,  we  propose  a  new method  on  image  encryption  which  is  based  on  a  Triple
Random Phase Encoding (TRPE) scheme. The TRPE is achieved by extending the well-known
Double Random Phase Encryption (DRPE) technique by adding an extra randomly generated
phase-only mask at the output plane.
The performance of the TRPE method was tested by conducting some numerical simulations. We
found that the TRPE scheme leads to a performance equivalent to that of the DRPE method for
the  encryption-decryption  process,  in  terms  of  mean-square  error  and  peak-signal-to  noise
metrics. In addition, the TRPE scheme enhances the performance of the DRPE method in terms
of security. Such improvement is proved by testing the method against different attacks to which
the DRPE method is vulnerable: chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), known-plaintext attacks (KPA)
and Chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).The results obtained by using the TRPE scheme fulfill the
requirements of invisible content, and thus, an illegal user neither can recover the decryption
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keys nor any plaintext. Therefore, the TRPE scheme proved its resistance to the attack above
mentioned in comparison with the DRPE and finds application in security data.
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Caption List
Fig. 1 The block diagrams for the TRPE scheme: (a) Encryption process; (b) Decryption process.
Fig. 2 Optical setup for the implementation of the encryption procedure of the TRPE scheme.
Fig. 3 (a) Lena image; (b) Lena encrypted image; (c) Lena decrypted image by using incorrect
keys;  (d)  Lena     decrypted  image  by using  correct  keys;  (e)  Binary  text  (BT)  image;  (f)
encrypted BT image; (g) BT decrypted image by using incorrect keys; (h) BT decrypted image
by using correct keys.
Fig. 4 Generated phase masks for the encryption-decryption steps.
Fig. 5 (a) chosen plaintext (Dirac delta function), (b) encrypted image of DRPE with CPA, (c)
decrypted image of DRPE with the CPA algorithm, (d) encrypted image of TRPE with CPA
algorithm, (e) decrypted image of TRPE with CPA algorithm.
Fig. 6 (a) Lena input image; (b) binary text input image; (c) and (e) DRPE encrypted images of
Lena and binary text, respectively; (d) and (f) DRPE decrypted images of Lena and binary text
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with KPA algorithm; (g) and (i) TRPE encrypted images of Lena and binary text, respectively;
(h) and (j) TRPE decrypted images of Lena and binary text with KPA algorithm.
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